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ABSTRACT 
We quantify the importance of peer effects in group lending by estimating a static game of incomplete 
information. In our model, group members make their repayment decisions simultaneously based on their 
household and loan characteristics as well as their expectations of other members’ repayment decisions. By 
exploiting a rich data set of a group lending program in India, our estimation results suggest that the 
probability of a member’s making a full repayment would be 15 percentage points higher if all the fellow 
members were to make full repayment, compared with a scenario in which none of the fellow members 
were to repay in full. We also find that large inconsistencies exist in the estimated effects of other variables 
in models that do not incorporate peer effects and control for unobserved group heterogeneity.  
Keywords: group lending, microfinance, peer effects, repayment 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
This paper provides, to our knowledge, the first structural analysis of peer effects in group lending 
programs. We model repayment decisions of group members using a static game of incomplete information 
and estimate the game based on a rich data set from a microfinance program in India. Since the 
establishment of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh in 1976, the practice of group lending has been widely 
adopted in microfinance programs in developing countries as an important tool to provide credit to the poor. 
Different from conventional individual lending, in group lending (or joint liability) a loan is granted to a 
group of borrowers and the whole group is liable for the debt of any individual member in the group. This 
practice allows microfinance programs to mainly rely on accountability and mutual trust among group 
members rather than financial collateral to insure against default. Given that the poor often do not have 
appropriate financial collateral to offer, group lending programs offer a feasible and even profitable channel 
to extend credit to the poor, who are usually kept out of traditional banking systems. 
Numerous theoretical studies exists that aim to explain the success of group lending, most of which 
employ a game-theoretical framework where members in a group are assumed to make their repayment 
decisions strategically. The success of group lending has been attributed to, among other things, the ability 
of such groups to mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard through peer effects. Peer effects have been 
intensively studied in the literature of education and social interactions, in which they are generally defined 
as how one’s performance is affected by her peers (e.g., Henderson et al. 1978, Evans et al. 1992, Angrist 
and Lang 1994). Peer effects in the group lending context arise from the joint liability arrangement in which 
a member’s utility (in terms of payoff) is determined not only by her own action but also by the fellow 
members’ actions. Peers can affect a member’s repayment decision through peer selection, peer 
monitoring, and peer pressure, all of which are believed to be less costly than the tools available to formal 
institutions in achieving the same goals (Stiglitz 1990; Banerjee et al. 1994; Besley and Coate 1995; de 
Aghion 1999; Morduch 1999; Conning 2005). The process of peer selection (or group formation) tends to 
screen the more risky households out of a group lending program. Through peer monitoring, members in a 
group can effectively monitor others’ usage of a loan and reduce ex-ante moral hazard (e.g., risky 
investment). Peer pressure refers to the fact that peers can exert pressure to enforce repayment and mitigate 
ex-post moral hazard (e.g., deliberate default). The effectiveness of these channels hinges on the premise 
that group members who live in close-knit poor communities can effectively identify as well as punish 
irresponsible members and deliberate defaulters through social penalties.
1
Despite a rich theoretical literature, empirical work on microfinance is scant. Although researchers 
recognize that strategic interactions among members are a critical element in group lending programs, it has 
not been modeled explicitly in existing empirical studies. Most of these studies treat a group as a decision 
maker and employ a single-agent choice model such as a logit or a tobit model to examine how group-level 
characteristics affect the probability of repayment by the whole group (e.g., Sharma and Zeller 1997; Zeller 
1998; Paxton et al. 2000; Wydick 1999; Ahlin and Townsend 2007). Karlan (2007) is probably the only one 
to explore determinants of the repayment decisions of individual members. In all these papers (including 
Karlan), peer effects are not estimated directly but are proxied by different measures of social ties, such as 
how close the group members live to one another, how well they know each other, and how closely related 
the members’ ethnic and cultural backgrounds are. 
  
The approach undertaken thus far in the empirical literature can probably be attributed to the 
following two reasons. First, incorporating strategic interactions into a discrete choice model is empirically 
challenging because, as to be discussed in more detail in the model and estimation section, it inevitably 
produces a nonlinear model with an endogenous variable that characterizes the repayment decision of other 
members in the group. Second, data of group lending programs with detailed member information that are 
suitable for a game theoretical framework are not easy to obtain. 
                                                       
1 Theoretical literature also points out potential pitfalls of group lending such as bad members who get a “free ride” off good 
clients and may exhibit a bad influence on others, for example, when many of the members default, some members would choose to 
default even when they would have repaid under individual lending (Besley and Coate 1995).  
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Different from previous empirical studies, we explicitly model and quantify strategic interactions 
among group members in the repayment stage. That is, we take group formation as given and focus on peer 
effects that arise from peer monitoring and peer pressure. We model the repayment decisions of group 
members in a static game of incomplete information in which members make their repayment decisions 
simultaneously based on their individual characteristics (some of which are unobserved by other members) 
as well as their expectations of other members’ repayment decisions. We estimate the game using the 
simulated maximum likelihood estimation method with a nested fixed-point algorithm, which recovers 
equilibrium repayment probabilities for all members in the game. These repayment probabilities are then 
used to form the likelihood function. Our estimation strategy follows the growing literature in estimating 
discrete choice games such as entry games in industrial organizations where one firm’s payoff from entry is 
affected by other firms’ entry decisions.
2
By exploiting a rich data set from a group lending program in Andhra Pradesh in India, our 
structural estimation quantifies the importance of peer effects as well as some member and loan 
characteristics studied in the previous literature. We find strong peer effects in the repayment decisions of 
program participants: The probability that a group member would make a full repayment would be 15 
percentage points higher if the member were in a group where all the fellow members repay in full than in a 
group where no fellow members make full repayment, ceteris paribus. Because the empirical model takes 
group formation as given, our estimate of peer effects captures the functioning of peer monitoring and peer 
pressure but not peer screening. Our empirical results also highlight the importance of explicitly modeling 
peer effects and controlling for unobserved group heterogeneity in empirical studies of group lending 
programs by showing that without doing so, large inconsistencies could arise in the estimated effects of 
other variables on repayment decisions.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the background of the 
microfinance program under study as well as the data. Section 3 presents the empirical model and 
estimation strategy. Section 4 reports estimation results and robustness analysis. We conclude our 
discussion in section 5. 
   
                                                       
2 To name just a few, Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) and Berry (1992) are two of the earlier studies in estimating static, discrete 
choice games. Recent studies include Seim (2006), Ellickson and Misra (2008), Jia (2008), and Bajari et al. (2009b).  
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2.  BACKGROUND AND DATA 
In this section, we start by discussing the history of group lending and the particular program under study. 
We describe mechanisms through which peer effects work. The data from the program are then presented. 
Group Lending and Peer Effects 
The origin of group lending can be traced back to 1976 when the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize winner, 
Muhammad Yunus, started the Grameen Bank Project, a lending project in several villages in Bangladesh. 
The goal of the project is to examine the feasibility of a credit delivery system (Grameen Bank) specifically 
targeted to the rural poor, who often do not have financial collateral and cannot obtain credit from 
conventional banks. Instead of requiring collateral, this new system employs a group-based credit approach 
and relies on peer effects within groups to ensure repayment. The project has achieved great success in 
delivering credit to the poor while attaining an almost 100 percent repayment rate. The achievement of 
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh has inspired similar endeavors in more than 40 developing countries, 
including one of Bangladesh’s neighbors, India. 
In 1992, India’s National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development organized 500 self-help 
groups (SHGs) composed of only women as a pilot program for delivering credit to the poor. Since then, the 
SHG program has witnessed tremendous growth that brought about one of the world’s largest and 
fastest-growing networks for microfinance. In 2007, some 40 million households were organized in more 
than 2.8 million SHGs that borrowed more than US$1 billion of credit from banks in 2006–2007 alone 
(Reserve Bank of India 2008). Cumulative credit disbursed to SHGs amounted to some US$4.5 billion (or 
about 10 percent of total rural credit) in India (Garikipati 2008). 
The SHG model in India combines savings generation and microlending with social mobilization. 
In this model, women who live in the same village voluntarily form SHGs with the understanding of a joint 
liability mechanism. A typical SHG consists of 10–20 members who meet regularly to discuss social issues 
and activities and, during these meetings, deposit a small thrift payment into a joint bank account. Once 
enough savings have been accumulated, group members can apply for internal loans that draw on those 
savings at an interest rate to be determined by the group. Having established a record of internal saving and 
repayment, the group can become eligible for loans through a commercial bank, normally at a fixed ratio 
(normally starting at 4:1) to its equity capital. The microfinance groups under study are located in Andhra 
Pradesh of India. Besides thrift savings and obtaining credit, SHGs in Andhra Pradesh also work as local 
institutions that take over implementation of government programs in a variety of areas such as distributing 
subsidized rice credit, life and property insurance, pension, and so on. In Andhra Pradesh, banks carry out 
microfinance business in nonoverlapped territories so that a group can only borrow from one bank.
3
Since we only have information on program participants, we focus on peer effects that arise after 
groups have been formed. Previous literatures have discussed several mechanisms through which peers 
influence a member’s repayment decisions (see, for example, Besley and Coate 1995; Morduch 1999; and 
Karlan 2007). Positive peer effects, which implies that a higher repayment rate of other members increases 
one’s own repayment likelihood, can derive from increasing the cost of defaulting, encouraging more 
diligent work ethics, and inspiring reciprocity and solidarity within groups. Members in a group are 
neighbors who know each other well, so they can observe one another’s usage of the funds and distinguish 
deliberate default from default due to irresponsible behaviors (such as investing in projects that are too 
risky, spending on alcohol and tobacco, etc.) from default due to unexpected negative shocks. The repaying 
 
Moreover, a bank only allows a group to have one outstanding loan. Once a loan is obtained by a group, it is 
immediately allocated among the members (mostly on an equal basis) with the repayment terms (such as 
interest rate, length, number of installments, etc.) set by the bank. The group cannot obtain loans from the 
bank in the future until the group has fully repaid the loan. 
                                                       
3 Only when a group cannot obtain a loan from the bank that specializes in the area where the group is located can the group 
apply for a loan from another bank. However, the group’s chances of obtaining a loan from other banks are rather slim.  
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members can thus impose social penalties to increase the cost of deliberate default and default due to 
irresponsible behaviors. Social penalties can take the forms of despise, not providing help in their 
production and other activities in the future, and so on. These penalties are severe in close-knit, poor 
communities, where people rely on each other in their daily life and, to an even larger extent, during times 
of distress (see Coate and Ravallion 1993). On the other hand, a member who defaults due to unexpected 
negative shocks is likely to be forgiven and covered by her peers, which can give her high incentive to pay 
back if her situation gets better. 
Nevertheless, another mechanism that has been raised in the literature (e.g., Besley and Coate 
1995) can result in negative peer effects. The mechanism suggests that some “bad,” nonpaying members 
can “free ride” off good, paying members by relying on the paying members’ help to repay the loan even 
though they have the ability to repay on their own, that is, they would repay in individual lending. The fact 
that the SHGs in Andhra Pradesh also serve as the organization base for programs and activities other than 
group lending implies that the potential social penalties can be very severe and that the free-rider problem is 
likely to be small: Free-riders are likely to be kept out of the groups through the intensive peer selection 
process and thus lose access to other programs implemented by the groups.
4 In addition, intensive 
interactions among group members also provide larger incentive for members to repay their own part even 
if their peers do not: They can build or maintain a good reputation, which would allow them to join other 
groups in the same village later, should the group fail.
5
Data 
 In our empirical estimation, we do not restrict the 
direction of peer effects a priori. The positive and significant peer effects found from our estimation implies 
that a higher repayment (default) rate of other members increases one’s own repayment (default) likelihood. 
This finding confirms that the free-rider problem is dominated by other mechanisms if it even exists at all. 
The data are from an SHG survey of 815 groups in Andhra Pradesh in India. In this survey, all loans taken 
by each group and by each member of the group between June 2003 and June 2006 are recorded from 
account books of each group. Thus, we have information on each loan taken by a group as a whole, as well 
as how the loan was allocated among group members. We also have information on terms of each loan and 
whether a loan had been fully repaid by each member by the time the survey was conducted. This survey 
also contains demographic information on group members, including poverty status, caste, occupation, 
housing condition, and education background. 
We investigate 1,008 “expired” group loans from commercial banks which had passed their due 
date by the time of the survey. Panel 1 of Table 1 presents summary statistics for member characteristics of 
the 815 groups, and Panel 2 summarizes terms of the 1,008 loans. The SHGs have 12 members on average, 
with the smallest group having 7 members and the largest having 20 members. About 26 percent of the 
members are from very poor households, 52 percent from poor households, and 22 percent from 
middle-class households.
6 About 31 percent of the members belong to scheduled tribe or scheduled caste, 
and 25 percent are literate. About 6.5 percent are disabled or have family members who are disabled; 41 
percent live in pucca houses, 33 percent live in semi-pucca houses, and 26 percent live in kutcha houses.
7
                                                       
4 These programs include the Rice Credit Line program that provides in-kind credit for subsidized rice, pension program, job 
training program, and so forth. 
 
About 64 percent are agricultural laborers (i.e., they do not own land or own such a small amount of land 
5 There are about 20–40 SHGs in each village in Andhra Pradesh. 
6 A household’s poverty category was assigned by the state’s 2001 “below poverty line” census complemented by 
“participatory identification of the poor” that added vulnerability and social exclusion to quantitative census indicators. The manual 
used in the process defines very poor as those who can eat only when they get work; lack shelter, proper clothing, and respect in 
society; and cannot send their children to school. The poor have no land, live on daily wages, and need to send school-going 
children to work in times of crisis. The middle class have some land and proper shelter, are recognized in society, have access to 
bank credit as well as public services, and can send their children to school. 
7 A pucca house has walls and a roof made of material such as burnt bricks, stones, cement concrete, and timber; but a kutcha 
house use less-sophisticated material such as hays, bamboos, mud, and grass.  
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that they have to provide agricultural labor for others). It is clear that most SHG members are from poor and 
vulnerable households. This is in line with the program’s goal to target the rural poor. 
Table 1. Summary statistics of dependent and explanatory variables 
Variable  Mean  SD 
Panel 1: SHG characteristics (815 SHGs)     
Number of members  12.40  2.38 
Percent of members who are poorest of the poor  0.261  0.337 
Percent of members who are poor  0.516  0.370 
Percent of members who are of middle class  0.223  0.326 
Percent of members who belong to scheduled tribe/caste  0.305  0.433 
Percent of members who belong to other castes  0.695  0.433 
Percent of literate members  0.253  0.238 
Percent of members who have some disabled family members  0.064  0.130 
Percent of members who own land  0.615  0.356 
Percent of members who own livestock  0.440  0.328 
Percent of members living in pucca house  0.405  0.351 
Percent of members living in semi-pucca house  0.336  0.365 
Percent of members living in kutcha house  0.255  0.287 
Percent of members who are self-employed agricultural workers  0.166  0.300 
Percent of members who are agricultural laborers  0.637  0.390 
Percent of members who take other occupations  0.197  0.313 
Located in Telangana  0.261  0.440 
Located in Rayalaseema  0.378  0.485 
Located in Coastal Andhra Pradesh  0.360  0.480 
Panel 2: Loan characteristics (1,008 loans)     
If fully repaid by all members  0.762   
If fully repaid by some of the members  0.075   
If fully repaid by none of the members  0.163   
Amount of loan (1,000 rupees)  34.05  28.32 
Number of members who received loan  10.95  3.70 
Annual rate of interest  12.70  2.82 
Length of loan (year)  1.065  0.408 
If repayment frequency at least monthly  0.974  0.159 
If due in 2005  0.490  0.500 
If due in 2006  0.426  0.495 
Note: S.D., standard deviation. 
We define default as failure to make a full repayment at the survey time if the loan was past due by 
then. Among the 1,008 expired group loans, 76 percent were fully repaid by all members to whom the loan 
was allocated, 7.5 percent were fully repaid by some members but defaulted by others, and 16.3 percent 
were defaulted by all members. The average loan size is 34,000 rupees (about US$682), and a loan is 
allocated to 11 members, on average. The average annual rate of interest is 12.7 percent, and the average 
duration of a loan is about a year. The majority of loans (97 percent) require the groups to make repayment 
at least monthly if not more frequently. 
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3.  MODEL AND ESTIMATION 
In this section, we first lay out a theoretical model to characterize household decisions in group lending. We 
then present our estimation strategy. 
Model 
In a group lending program, households form groups in order to get loans from a lender such as a 
commercial bank. The loan is extended to the group and divided among members, and the group as a whole 
is held liable should one or more members fail to make repayment. We index group loan by  g  and member 
(i.e., a household) by i. We denote the choice set of a member in group loan g  by  } 1 , 0 { = gi A
, where 1 
represents a full repayment and 0  otherwise. Let the Cartesian product  gi i g A A × =
 denote the possible 
actions of all borrowers and define 
) , , , ( 2 1 g gN g g g a a a a … =
 as an element in  g A
, where  g N
 is the 
number of members that participated in group loan g . Let  gi x
 be the characteristics of member i, and 
{ }
g gN g g g x x x x , , , 2 1 … =
 denote the characteristics of all participating members in the loan. We assume that 
g x
 is observed by all members in the group. However, we allow that some components of   are not 
observed by researchers. 
In the following presentation, however, we suppress group loan index  g  for brevity. The utility of 
member i after the realization of repayment decisions by all members in the loan is  
  ), ( ) , , ( ) , , , ( i i i i i i i i i i a x a a U x a a U ε ε + = − −   (1) 
where  i a  is the action taken by member i, and  i a−  is a vector of actions of other members in the same 
loan.  ) ( i a ε  is a stochastic preference shock that is additively separable in the utility function as in a 
standard random utility model. We assume that  ) ( i a ε  is observed only by member i. This term can also be 
interpreted as unobserved individual characteristics. The key feature of the utility function is the presence 
of actions taken by others in the loan,  i a− . With  ) ( i a ε  being private information, the above model is a 
static game with incomplete information. A pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in such a game is 
defined by )) ( , ), ( ), ( ( 2 2 1 1 N N a a a a ε ε ε
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ = … , where  } 1 , 0 { ) ( ∈
∗
i i a ε  maximizes the expected utility,  
 
, ) ( ) ), ( , ( ) , , ( i i i i i i i i i i d f x a a U x a U ε ε ε ε ε + = − − −
∗
− ∫   (2) 
for any  } ,..., 2 , 1 { N i∈ .  
To take the model to the data, we normalize the utility of member i from loan default to be zero, 
and assume that the normalized  i ε  (i.e.,  ) 0 ( ) 1 ( = − = i i a a ε ε  in previous notations) has a logistic 





) , , , 1 ( i i j
i j
i i i i i x a
N





  (3)  
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Because of the normalization, the above function captures how member i’s utility difference 
between the two choices—repay in full or default—is related to the explanatory variables. The actions of 
other members in the loan are summarized in a single variable  j i j N a ∑ ≠ −1
1 , the proportion of members other 
than i who make full repayment. Following the literature of education and social interactions (e.g., Brock 
and Durlauf 2001; Cooley 2006), we use this term to capture peer effects that arise through multiple 
channels as discussed earlier. For example, since the default of member i can hinder the ability of other 
members to obtain credit in the future, other members may impose social penalties to member i in various 
forms to enforce repayment. The cost of default (or the benefit of repayment) of member i should be higher 
when more other members choose to repay, ceteris paribus. Although this suggests positive peer effects 
and hence complementarity among group members in making full repayment, the free-rider problem 
discussed in the previous section implies the opposite. In the estimation, we do not restrict the direction of 
the coefficient on the peer effect term,γ .  
Given the above utility function, the expected utility (or ex ante utility with respect to others’ 
decisions) of member i becomes:  











i i i i a i i i
x x a
N
x x a E
N

















  (4) 
Therefore, household i will choose to fully repay the loan if and only if  0 ) , , 1 ( > = i i i x a U ε . The 
optimal choice by member i implies that the ex ante probability of a full repayment (before the realization 











i j i j N









  (5) 
where  ) | 1 ( Prob x a P i i = = . Note that the logit form of the choice probability as in a logit model follows 
the assumption that  i ε  has a logistic distribution. Denote the probabilities of full repayment for all 
members in the group loan by  ) , , , ( 2 1 N P P P P … = . These probabilities that are consistent with the 
Bayesian Nash equilibrium are therefore defined by the fixed point of the mapping  ) ( g g P M P =
, where 
Ng Ng M ] 1 , 0 [ ] 1 , 0 [ : (.) →  is a continuous function whose single dimension is represented by equation (4). 
These probabilities also correspond to the quantal response equilibrium defined by McKelvey and Palfrey 
(1995). The existence of a fixed point to the above function follows directly from Brouwer’s fixed-point 
theorem. Nevertheless, the uniqueness of the fixed point is not guaranteed, and the implication on 
estimation will be discussed below. 
Estimation Strategy 
There are several challenges in taking the choice probabilities defined by equation (5) to the data. First, 
some variables that affect individual payment decisions (e.g., components of xg), though observed by group 
members, could be unobserved by researchers. These unobservables may include group solidarity and  
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reciprocity, as well as weather conditions. It is important to incorporate these unobservables in the 
empirical analysis for the following reasons. The information advantage of group members over outsiders 
and lenders, in addition to being plausible, is essential in justifying the idea of group lending (i.e., versus 
individual lending). More importantly, failure to control for these unobservables would lead to 
overestimation of the importance of peer effects in increasing the repayment rate. For example, in the event 
of a group’s suffering from a common negative shock (e.g., an adverse weather condition), we would 
wrongly attribute the lowered repayment of a member to peer effects without controlling for the common 
shock. In our estimation, we allow loan-level or group-level unobservables to be represented by a single 






) , 1 ( gi g gi gj
i j g
gi gi gi gi z P
N
x a u ε ξ β γ ε + + +
−
= = ∑
≠   (6) 
where  { } . , g gi gi z x ξ =
  gi z  is the part of xgi that is observable to researchers. It includes both household 










g gi gj i j N













  (7) 
Since  g ξ  is unobservable to researchers, the above choice probabilities cannot be directly taken to 
the data. As it turns out, the way to deal with the common unobservable is closely related to the next 
empirical challenge. 
The second empirical challenge is fundamental in incorporating strategic interactions into the 
discrete choice model, and it lies in the fact that one of the explanatory variables is unobserved: member i’s 
expectation about the average repayment rate among all the fellow members  gj i j N i g P P E
g ∑ = ≠ − − 1
1
, ) ( . 
Although the observed outcome,
 
gj i j N a
g ∑ ≠ −1
1 , is a natural choice for the expectation variable, it is 
correlated with the individual error term,  gi ε  (and  g ξ  as well). Due to the nonlinear nature of the model, 
the standard instrumental variable method cannot be applied to deal with the endogeneity problem. Bajari et 
al. (2009b) propose a two-step estimator to address this problem. The key idea is to note that in the absence 
of unobserved group heterogeneity ( g ξ ), the choice probabilities are determined by zg only in the 
equilibrium, albeit via a nonanalytical form. In principle, a consistent estimate of the choice probabilities 
can be obtained based on zg through a flexible estimation method (e.g., nonparametrically) in the first step, 
and these estimates can then be plugged in to the right side of equation (5) in place of  gj i j N P
g ∑ ≠ −1
1  to form 
likelihood function. However, this method cannot be applied when group-level unobservables exist, 
because consistent estimates of choice probabilities cannot be obtained based on only zg in that case. In 
order to make the two-step method applicable in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, Bajari et al. 
(2009b) make the assumption that the group-level unobservable has a fixed effects presentation and is an 
unknown, but smooth, function of the observed variables. However, this assumption could be too strong for 
our data. For example, local weather condition variations may not have much correlation with observed 
household demographics. 
Instead, we assume that the common unobservable  g ξ
 
is uncorrelated with observed variables zg, 
and that  ) , 0 (
2 σ ξ N gi ∼  is independent and identically distributed across loans. It is worth noting that,  
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different from the random effects model without strategic interactions where the unobservable is assumed 
to be uncorrelated with all explanatory variables, the common unobservable  g ξ
 
in our model is 
nevertheless correlated with the key explanatory variable  ) ( , i g P E − , which is an equilibrium outcome. For a 
given set of parameters and a random draw for each group loan g, a fixed-point algorithm based on equation 
(7) can be used to recover the choice probabilities for all the members in the group. These probabilities can 
then be used to form the (simulated) likelihood function. The estimation strategy is a maximum simulated 
likelihood method with a nested fixed-point algorithm. Because the fixed-point algorithm has to be done as 
many times as the number of random draws for each  g ξ  in each parameter iteration, this approach, with the 
benefit of being more efficient, is much more computationally demanding than the two-step approach. 
The third empirical challenge arises from the possibility of multiple equilibria, which are more 
likely to happen when peer effects are positive and strong.
8
We note in passing that two alternative empirical approaches to deal with multiple equilibria have 
been proposed recently, both in the context of discrete games of complete information. As an alternative to 
point identification, Tamer (2003) develops bounds estimation based on the necessary conditions for pure 
strategy Nash equilibria. Bajari et al. (2009a) proposes an approach where an equilibrium selection 
mechanism is estimated together with utility parameters and all equilibria including those of mixed 
strategies are computed. Although both approaches are very promising, the computational burden can 
become prohibitive as the number of players becomes larger than 5 (the number of players ranges from 2 to 
25, with the mean being 12 in our data). For example, Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) apply the bounds 
approach to examine the strategic behavior of four airlines. Bajari et al. (2009a) find that it takes up to 20 
minutes for the central processing unit on a 3.0 GHz single processor workstation to compute all Nash 
equilibria and focus on four large firms in their empirical example.
 With multiple equilibria, the probability of an 
observed outcome is undefined without a specification of the equilibrium mechanism. In principle, one can 
compute all (and finite) fixed points to the system of equations defined by equation (7) via an all-solution 
homotopy method (see Bajari et al. 2009b). The likelihood function can then be formed based on all the 
recovered equilibria and a specified equilibrium selection mechanism. However, this method is very 
computationally intensive, if not practically infeasible for our data, given the significant time needed to find 
all equilibria especially in games with a small number of players, the large number of random draws to deal 
with common unobservables, and the large number of groups. Instead, we follow one of the approaches in 
the literature and assume that only one equilibrium is observed in the data if multiple equilibria do arise 
(Seim 2006; Zhu and Singh 2009; Ellickson and Misra 2008). This approach specifies which type of 
equilibrium (such as random or extremal equilibria) is picked in the empirical model. Robustness analysis 
with respect to this assumption is provided below. 
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To illustrate our estimation strategy, let ygi denote the repayment outcome of gi and 
 From an alternative angle, Goldfarb 
and Xiao (2009) provide a strategy to avoid multiple equilibria in empirical work. Following cognitive 
hierarchy models in behavior game theory, they allow for heterogeneity in the ability of players to correctly 
conjecture competitor behavior in entry games. By revising the behavioral assumption from complete to 
limited rationality in decision making, their empirical model yields a unique outcome. 
g g ν σ ξ ∗ = , 
where ν  has an independent and identically distributed (across g) standard normal distribution and σ  is 
the standard deviation of a normal distribution. The joint probability of the observed outcome for group g 
conditional on a realization of ν  is: 
                                                       
8 See Brock and Durlauf (2001b) and Bayer and Timmins (2007) for the equilibrium property in the context of social 
interactions where the reference group is large. 
9 It is interesting to note that the simulation results in Bajari et al. (2009b) show that the number of equilibria decreases with the 
number of players in static games of incomplete information.  
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where  ) , | ( g g gi gi z y a P ν =
 
can be obtained based on the fixed points recovered from a system of Ng 
equations defined as (7). The joint probability for group g without conditioning on the unobservable is 
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The above joint probability can be approximated by 
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where R is the total number of draws and w
r the weight of the r
th draw. Define  ) , , ( σ β γ ϑ = . The objective 
function to be maximized is 
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where G is the total number of group loans. Note that the fixed-point algorithm has to be carried out  G R∗  
times for each parameter iteration. 
To understand the identification of the peer effect coefficient, imagine that there are two 
households that are identical except for a difference in group loans, and further assume there are no 
common unobservables to ease exposition. The repayment decisions of the two households may be 
different solely due to a difference in the repayment rate of the peers in the two loans. Intuitively, peer 
effects are identified from the difference in the two households’ repayment decisions in relation to other 
members’ repayment decisions. In the presence of common unobservables, the group loans with members 
who make different repayment decisions (7.5 percent of the loans in the data) are essential because the 
model would not be identified without these loans. For example, drivers of any given group’s members 
making the same decisions in the data could be very large positive shocks for the groups with full 
repayment and very large negative shocks for the groups that default, even for different sets of parameters 
θ. Similarly, if we were to allow group-level or loan-level fixed effects, these fixed effects could perfectly 
predict the outcomes.   
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4.  RESULTS AND ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS 
In this section, we first present our estimation results for several different specifications including the 
preferred specification. We then discuss caveats in our study and carry out robustness analysis with respect 
to several assumptions employed in the preferred specification. 
Results 
We estimate our empirical model defined by equations (6) and (7) using the simulated maximum likelihood 
estimation method with a nested fixed-point algorithm. For a given set of parameters and a random draw of 
g ν
 for each  g , the fixed-point algorithm recovers the equilibrium repayment probabilities of each member 
in a group loan based on equation (7). These probabilities are then used to evaluate the likelihood function 
defined by equation (11). To reduce computational burden, we use Gauss–Hermite quadrature to 




r w  are predetermined node and weight 
whose values depend on the number of nodes used for approximation. Because the choice probabilities can 
be highly nonlinear, we use as high as 64 points for the approximation in equation (10), recognizing the 
tradeoff between approximation accuracy and computational burden. Robustness checks are performed 
with respect to approximation and are discussed in the next section. 
Table 2 presents the parameter estimates as well as their standard errors (in parentheses) for several 
specifications. The results for the preferred specification are in the last column, labeled Full Model, where 
both peer effects and unobserved heterogeneity are included in the model. To investigate the importance of 
modeling peer effect and unobserved heterogeneity, we also estimate three alternative models. The first is a 
logit model with neither peer effects nor unobserved heterogeneity. The second alternative model has the 
peer effect term but no unobserved heterogeneity (see Peer Pressure Only column), and the third alternative 
model controls for unobserved heterogeneity but not peer effects (Unobservables Only column). In all four 
specifications, we control for member characteristics (including poverty status, caste, disability, literacy, 
land and livestock ownership, housing condition, and occupation), loan characteristics (including loan size 
and repayment terms), and year and location fixed effects. The likelihood and pseudo 
2 R  values in the Peer 
Pressure Only and Unobservables Only models show that controlling for unobserved heterogeneity can 
dramatically improve the model fit. This perhaps is not surprising given that in about 84 percent of all the 
group loans, members make the same repayment choices. The peer effect term also improves the fitness of 
the model, and its coefficient estimate is positive and statistically significant in both the Peer Effect Only 
Model and Full Model. 
Because the parameter estimates cannot be compared directly across the models, we compute the 
(sample) average partial effects of the explanatory variables and present them in Table 3.
10
i
 For the two 
models with the peer effect term, Peer Pressure Only and Full Model, we report two types of partial 
effects—the direct partial effect and the total partial effect—of the explanatory variables. The difference 
between the two is that the total partial effect incorporates the feedback (the indirect effect) transmitted 
through the peer effect term. That is, a change in the characteristics of household   will not only have a 
direct effect on its repayment propensity but also have an indirect effect through its influence on other 
households in the loan. For instance, the direct and total partial effects of a very poor household on loan 
repayment are estimated at –0.005 and –0.015, respectively, in the full model.  
                                                       
10 We compute partial effects for each observation in the data, and the averages of these estimates across all observations are 
presented.  
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Table 2. Parameter estimates (and standard errors) 
  Logit Model  Peer Pressure Only  Unobservables Only  Full Model 
Member characteristics                   
Dummy for poorest family  –0.315  (0.06)  –0.269  (0.021)  –0.352  (0.350)  –0.387  (0.195) 
Dummy for not being poor  0.314  (0.076)  0.252  (0.027)  0.434  (0.337)  0.201  (0.223) 
If scheduled tribe/caste  –0.138  (0.06)  –0.069  (0.013)  –1.728  (0.284)  –0.849  (0.216) 
Any household member disabled  0.088  (0.105)  0.129  (0.049)  –0.330  (0.467)  –0.272  (0.513) 
If literate  0.017  (0.061)  –0.012  (0.024)  –0.355  (0.307)  –0.150  (0.265) 
If own land  0.014  (0.059)  0.008  (0.017)  –0.202  (0.283)  –0.296  (0.199) 
If own livestock  –0.024  (0.057)  –0.035  (0.019)  –0.040  (0.282)  –0.022  (0.213) 
If live in pucca house  –0.043  (0.065)  –0.029  (0.019)  0.580  (0.311)  0.125  (0.212) 
If live in kutcha house  –0.263  (0.067)  –0.262  (0.025)  –0.061  (0.356)  –0.421  (0.249) 
If self-employed agricultural 
worker  0.211  (0.097)  0.199  (0.029)  0.200  (0.476)  0.666  (0.37) 
If agricultural laborer  0.118  (0.065)  0.082  (0.018)  –0.356  (0.343)  0.285  (0.276) 
Loan characteristics                   
Amount of loan (1,000 rupees)  –1.189  (0.093)  –0.765  (0.05)  –1.041  (0.319)  –0.627  (0.253) 
Annual rate of interest  –0.064  (0.01)  –0.041  (0.003)  –0.514  (0.045)  –0.194  (0.038) 
Length of loan (year)  –0.272  (0.062)  –0.149  (0.014)  –4.839  (0.352)  –2.283  (0.361) 
Repay monthly or weekly  –0.403  (0.198)  –0.307  (0.049)  1.422  (0.866)  0.954  (0.502) 
If due in 2005  –0.305  (0.117)  –0.287  (0.029)  –0.022  (0.933)  0.113  (0.696) 
If due in 2006  –1.087  (0.119)  –0.793  (0.038)  –7.908  (1.032)  –3.129  (0.877) 
Group location                   
Located in Telangana  0.151  (0.074)  0.068  (0.015)  6.545  (0.404)  3.124  (0.552) 
Located in Rayalaseema  –0.106  (0.061)  –0.052  (0.013)  0.855  (0.387)  0.655  (0.236) 
Unobservables and peer effects                 
Standard deviation of common 
unobservables           14.223  (0.778)  7.119  (1.155) 
E(P-i)      2.018  (0.176)       4.083  (0.427) 
log-likelihood  –4999.74    –4989.38    –1064.05    –1045.21   
Pseudo_R2  0.074    0.076    0.803    0.806   
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Table 3. Partial effects  
  Logit Model  Peer Pressure Only  Unobservables Only  Full Model 
  PE    DPE  TPE    PE    DPE  TPE   
Household characteristics                       
Dummy for poorest family  –0.045  ***  –0.039  –0.059  ***  –0.006    –0.005  –0.015  ** 
Dummy for not being poor  0.045  ***  0.036  0.055  ***  0.008    0.003  0.008   
If scheduled tribe/caste  –0.020  ***  –0.01  –0.015  ***  –0.030  ***  –0.011  –0.032  *** 
Any household member disabled  0.013    0.018  0.028  ***  –0.006    –0.003  –0.010   
If literate  0.002    –0.002  –0.003    –0.006    –0.002  –0.006   
If own land  0.002    0.001  0.002    –0.004    –0.004  –0.011   
If own livestock  –0.003    –0.005  –0.008  *  –0.001    0.000  –0.001   
If live in pucca house  –0.006    –0.004  –0.006    0.010  *  0.002  0.005   
If live in kutcha house  –0.037  ***  –0.038  –0.057  ***  –0.001    –0.005  –0.016  * 
If self-employed agricultural worker  0.030  **  0.029  0.043  ***  0.003    0.008  0.025  * 
If agricultural laborer  0.017  *  0.012  0.018  ***  –0.006    0.004  0.011   
Loan characteristics                       
Amount of loan (1,000 rupees)  –0.169  ***  –0.11  –0.166  ***  –0.018  ***  –0.008  –0.024  ** 
Annual rate of interest  –0.009  ***  –0.006  –0.009  ***  –0.009  ***  –0.002  –0.007  *** 
Length of loan (year)  –0.039  ***  –0.021  –0.032  ***  –0.083  ***  –0.029  –0.086  *** 
Repay monthly or weekly  –0.057  **  –0.044  –0.067  ***  0.025  *  0.012  0.036  * 
If due in 2005  –0.043  ***  –0.041  –0.062  ***  0.000    0.001  0.004   
If due in 2006  –0.155  ***  –0.114  –0.172  ***  –0.136  ***  –0.039  –0.118  *** 
Group location                       
Located in Telangana  0.022  **  0.01  0.015  ***  0.113  ***  0.039  0.118  *** 
Located in Rayalaseema  –0.015  *  –0.007  –0.011  ***  0.015  **  0.008  0.025  *** 
E(P-i)      0.323        0.0895   
Note: PE, partial effect; DPE, direct partial effect, which does not take into account the multiplier/feedback effect present in the model; TPE, total partial effect, which takes into 
account the multiplier effect. All partial effects are the sample averages of individual partial effects.  
* parameter estimate significant at 10 percent level  
** parameter estimate significant at 5 percent level  
*** parameter estimate significant at 1 percent level 
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This means, a change of household i’s status from being very poor to being poor (the base group) 
would increase the repayment probability by 0.5 percent, holding all other explanatory variables (including 
other households’ repayment probabilities) constant. However, a change in household i’s repayment 
decision would change the repayment decisions of others in the same group loan due to the presence of peer 
effects, which would in turn affect the repayment decision of household i. Therefore, the total partial effect 
is the partial effect when the new equilibrium has been achieved. It should be larger than the direct partial 
effect if the peer effect term has a positive coefficient and lower than the direct partial effect otherwise. 
Based on our model estimation, the total partial effect of the wealth status changing from poor to very poor 
is –0.015, three times as large as the direct partial effect. The larger the peer effect coefficient γ  is, the 
larger the difference between the total partial effect and the direct partial effect should be. The total partial 
effects for other variables are also about three times as large as the direct partial effects in the full model. 
In order to gauge the importance of peer effects in group lending, we conduct two analyses based 
on parameter estimates. First, we compute the total partial effect of the peer effect variable  ) ( i P E −  on 
repayment probability. The estimated total partial effect of the peer effect variable is 0.154, comparing the 
direct partial effect of 0.051. To understand this estimate, imagine a group with 11 members: Members 1 to 
10 receive positive shocks (e.g., an increase in  gi ε ) such that each one’s repayment probabilities increases 
by 0.1 holding other factors constant; therefore, for Member 11,  ) ( 1 − P E  increases by 0.1. As a result, the 
repayment probability of Member 11 in the new equilibrium will increase by 1.54 percent according to our 
estimate.  
The second way to quantify the importance of peer effects is to look at what would be the change in 
a member’s repayment probability if she is in a group with no other fellow members repaying in full, 
compared with her being a group with all other members making full repayment while keeping other factors 
the same across the two groups. Based on the parameter estimates in the full model, the average repayment 
rate across all observations would be 71.5 percent if  0 ) ( = −i P E , compared with 86.3 percent if  1 ) ( = −i P E
. The difference is about 15 percentage points, which provides a similar quantification of the importance of 
peer effects to the first method. Because our data include information only about participants in group 
lending programs and our analysis takes group formation as given, we refrain from interpreting these 
estimates as the difference in repayment rate between group lending and individual lending for all 
borrowers.  
The comparison of the partial effects between the Peer Pressure Only model and the Full Model 
highlights the importance of controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. In the Peer Pressure Only model, 
where unobserved heterogeneity is not controlled for, the total partial effect of peer effects on loan 
repayment is 0.439, compared with 0.154 in the Full Model. Similarly, the average treatment effect is 0.383 
in the Peer Pressure Only model, while it is estimated at 0.148 in the Full Model. The estimates of the (total) 
partial effects of other variables can also differ dramatically across the four models. For example, the 
estimated partial effect of a poverty status of very poor in the three alternative models is –0.045, –0.059, and 
–0.006, compared with –0.015 in the Full Model. In addition, qualitative differences exist for some 
variables across the four models. The results from the Logit Model and the Peer Pressure Only model show 
that high repayment frequency is associated with higher repayment rate, while the Unobservables Only 
Model and the Full Model show the opposite. This suggests that without controlling for peer effect and 
unobserved heterogeneity, a large inconsistency may exist in the estimated effects of observed household 
demographics as well as loan characteristics.  
The estimated effects of most other variables on repayment rate are intuitively signed from the full 
model. The results in Tables 2 and 3 show that being very poor, belonging to a scheduled tribe or caste, and 
living in a house of low quality (kutcha house) are associated with lower probability of full repayment; but 
being a self-employed agricultural worker and having a smaller loan size, lower interest rate, and shorter 
loan duration are all associated with higher probability of full repayment.  
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Discussion and Robustness Analysis 
Two caveats are worth mentioning regarding our empirical analysis. The first one, common in empirical 
studies of games, concerns possible multiple equilibria. As discussed in Section 3, the possibility of 
multiple equilibria poses a significant empirical challenge because without an equilibrium selection 
mechanism, the likelihood is not well defined in the presence of multiple equilibria. Moreover, 
incorporating the algorithm of finding all possible multiple equilibria (e.g., all solution homotopy methods) 
in the estimation will be prohibitive because it has to be done for a large number of random draws for each 
loan. We follow the literature and assume that only one equilibrium is played in the data. In practice, we 
draw the starting values (the length of the vector equal to the number of participating households in the 
group) for the fixed-point algorithm randomly from the uniform distribution. Nevertheless, the starting 
values are fixed across parameter iterations. The algorithm stops once it reaches a fixed point, which is 
assumed to be the equilibrium played in the data. To check the robustness of the solution to the starting 
value (hence the equilibrium selected in case of multiple equilibria), we re-estimate the model twice with 
the starting value being a vector of ones as well as a vector of zeros. This amounts to assuming that only 
extremal equilibrium (i.e., the one with the highest or lowest group repayment rate) will be selected. The 
parameter estimates and the estimated total partial effects are reported in columns 2 and 3 in Table 4. They 
are almost identical to the results reported in Table 3. In light of the simulation result in Bajari et al. (2009b) 
that the likelihood of multiple equilibria decreases dramatically with the number of players, our robustness 
analysis suggests that the effect of multiple equilibria on our empirical results is likely to be insignificant. 
The second caveat regards the assumption that the group-level common unobservable is 
uncorrelated with observed variables such as household characteristics and loan characteristics. The causal 
interpretation of these variables on the repayment rate hinges on this assumption. Therefore, a cautious 
approach is to interpret the estimated effects of observed household and loan characteristics on repayment 
decisions as correlation rather than causality. However, since our main interest in this paper is in peer effect, 
we re-estimate the model using different sets of explanatory variables to check the robustness of our 
estimate for peer effect term. All of them yield very close results.
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In addition to the robustness analysis regarding possible multiple equilibria and various sets of 
explanatory variables, we also perform the following robustness checks. The results for the full model 
reported in Table 3 are based on 64 points’ Gauss–Hermite approximation for the joint probabilities defined 
in equation (9). The results based on 56 points’ approximation, listed in column 4 of Table 4, are very 
similar to those in Table 3. We note in passing that we find that the 64 points’ Gauss–Hermite 
approximation for the joint probability is closer to the simulated joint probability based on 5,000 
randomized Halton draws (i.e., could be viewed as the truth) than the approximation based on 150 
randomized Halton draws for some randomly selected groups with the estimated parameters. These 
findings suggest that the simulated method exhibits good numerical properties. 
  
The last robustness check is with respect to the assumption about the unobserved heterogeneity. In 
previous estimations, we have assumed that households participating in each loan face a common 
unobservable. In our data, we observe multiple loans for some groups, though the loans are not necessarily 
among the same households. We re-estimate the model assuming a common unobservable among the 
households in the same group even if they may participate in different loans. That is, we now assume the 
unobservable is at the group-level rather than at the loan-level. The estimation results are listed in the last 
column of Table 4. With unobservables being at the group level, the total partial effect of  ) ( i P E −  is now 
estimated at 0.193 instead of 0.154 when unobservables are assumed to be at the loan level. 
   
                                                       
11 The estimates of the total partial effect of the peer effect term range from 0.140 to 0.160 for four different sets of explanatory 
variables. Estimation results are available upon request.  
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Table 4. Robustness analysis 
   Start Value 1  Start Value 0  56 Points’ Approximation  Group-level Heterogeneity 
   Coeff.  S.E.  TPE  Coeff.  S.E.  TPE  Coeff.  S.E.  TPE  Coeff.  S.E.  TPE 
Member characteristics                            
Dummy for poorest 
family  –0.387  0.245  –0.005  –0.387  0.245  –0.005  –0.373  0.197  –0.005  0.164  0.117  0.003 
Dummy for not being 
poor  0.203  0.234  0.003  0.201  0.223  0.003  0.251  0.223  0.003  0.57  0.138  0.01 
If scheduled tribe/caste  –0.849  0.22  –0.011  –0.849  0.217  –0.011  –0.866  0.214  –0.011  –0.893  0.126  –0.015 
Any household member 
disabled  –0.272  0.464  –0.003  –0.272  0.495  –0.003  –0.291  0.203  –0.004  –0.942  0.118  –0.016 
If literate  –0.155  0.259  –0.002  –0.15  0.268  –0.002  –0.021  0.211  0  –0.013  0.139  0 
If own land  –0.296  0.194  –0.004  –0.296  0.2  –0.004  –0.238  0.27  –0.003  0.094  0.136  0.002 
If own livestock  –0.022  0.22  0  –0.022  0.215  0  –0.262  0.457  –0.003  –0.216  0.391  –0.004 
If live in pucca house  0.125  0.249  0.002  0.125  0.214  0.002  0.135  0.222  0.002  0.089  0.135  0.002 
If live in kutcha house  –0.421  0.287  –0.005  –0.421  0.251  –0.005  –0.32  0.237  –0.004  –0.293  0.131  –0.005 
If self-employed 
agricultural worker  0.666  0.367  0.008  0.666  0.368  0.008  0.66  0.361  0.008  0.086  0.209  0.002 
If agricultural laborer  0.284  0.29  0.004  0.285  0.279  0.004  0.331  0.26  0.004  0.067  0.142  0.001 
Loan characteristics                                                                                                             
Amount of loan (1,000 
rupees)  –0.627  0.248  –0.008  –0.627  0.256  –0.008  –0.635  0.235  –0.008  –1.629  0.166  –0.028 
Annual rate of interest  –0.194  0.038  –0.002  –0.194  0.038  –0.002  –0.193  0.038  –0.003  –0.279  0.018  –0.005 
Length of loan (year)  –2.283  0.361  –0.029  –2.283  0.361  –0.029  –2.304  0.356  –0.029  –0.875  0.085  –0.015 
Repay monthly or weekly  0.954  0.917  0.012  0.954  0.604  0.012  0.987  1.173  0.013  –0.355  0.226  –0.006 
If due in 2005  0.113  0.702  0.001  0.113  0.694  0.001  0.174  0.704  0.002  –1.843  0.299  –0.031 
If due in 2006  –3.13  0.886  –0.039  –3.129  0.879  –0.039  –3.191  0.87  –0.041  –3.621  0.344  –0.062 
Group location                                                                                                             
Located in Telangana  3.124  0.592  0.039  3.124  0.554  0.039  3.182  0.557  0.041  3.404  0.189  0.058 
Located in Rayalaseema  0.657  0.245  0.008  0.655  0.238  0.008  0.623  0.208  0.008  0.424  0.098  0.007 
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Table 4. Continued 
   Start Value 1  Start Value 0  56 Points’ Approximation  Group-level Heterogeneity 
   Coeff.  S.E.  TPE  Coeff.  S.E.  TPE  Coeff.  S.E.  TPE  Coeff.  S.E.  TPE 
Unobservables and peer 
effects                                                                         
Standard deviation of 
common unobservables  7.119  1.163  0.09  7.119  1.16  0.089  6.854  1.067  0.087  5.221  0.218  0.089 
E(P-i)  4.082  0.428  0.051  4.083  0.429  0.051  4.056  0.406  0.052  4.118  0.145  0.07 
log-likelihood  –1045.2                    –1045.2                    –1047.9                    –1328.2                   
Pseudo_R2  0.806                    0.806                    0.806                    0.754                   
Note:  Coeff, coefficient; S.E., standard error; TPE, total partial effect. 
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5.  CONCLUSION 
Despite the common belief that peer effects play a significant role in mitigating the moral hazard problem in 
group lending, how quantitatively important those effects are has remained an unanswered question. We 
address this question by modeling members’ repayment decisions in group lending as a static game of 
incomplete information where group members make their repayment decisions simultaneously based on 
their individual characteristics and loan characteristics, as well as the expectation of other members’ 
repayment decisions. Using a rich member-level data set from a group lending program in India, we find 
large and positive peer effects: Everything else being equal, the probability of a member’s making full 
repayment would be 15 percentage points higher on average if all the other members in the group repay in 
full compared with a scenario in which none of the other members makes full repayment. 
This paper is a first attempt to use a game-theoretical framework to empirically investigate the 
effects of different mechanisms on the performance of group lending programs. Our structural analysis 
demonstrates the importance of explicit modeling of strategic interactions inherent in group lending 
programs as well as how recent empirical advances in estimating discrete choice games can be employed in 
this line of research. There are many interesting questions yet to be answered that necessitate either richer 
data or dynamic modeling. These questions include peer selection, possible heterogeneity in peer effects 
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